Although many of Heyes ' (1994) interpretations of mirror self-recognition are in agreement with other critics, her analyses of the methodology used to detect self-recognition are not always compelling and are sometimes inaccurate. She describes a set of the behaviour patterns taken as evidence of self-directed behaviour, for example picking bits of food from between the teeth, or making faces, yet fails to state the essential criterion that each behaviour pattern had to occur while the organism was looking at its image in the mirror. Throughout her presentation she ignores that the animal is looking at its image when it performs these self-directed behaviour patterns, as if she fails to recognize that this looking is part of the animal's 'behaviour'. According to Heyes, these examples of self-directed behaviour indicate that 'Self-directed behaviour was never objectively defined' (page 911), but why this list of observables is not 'objective' is never made clear; anyone doing observational studies knows that different behaviour patterns may fit one descriptive category. Yet, in contrast to her own concerns about objectivity, Heyes suggests that a capuchin monkey who cocked his head while looking in a mirror and stroked his chest (nine times over a 10-h period) exhibited what 'Some observers might interpret . . . as a classic gesture of selfcontemplation or admiration' (page 911). This suggestion is less 'objective' than those typically used in that it is ambiguous, the animal could be 'admiring' another monkey, and should be viewed by Heyes as inadequate evidence because no control data about the frequency of this gesture is provided, a situation Heyes deplores when used by other researchers.
Heyes argues that control data are not provided in Gallup's original study for 'self-directed behaviour', and therefore his observations are suspect. However, this criticism is problematic in two ways. First, Gallup himself was concerned that self-directed behaviour would be viewed as insupportable as evidence of self-recognition, so he instituted the mark test to measure the phenomenon more 'objectively'; as a result, he provided control data about mark-directed behaviour before and while the chimps watched themselves in a mirror (Gallup 1970 (Gallup , 1994 . (Readers new to this topic should note that 'mark-directed behaviour patterns' are usually classed separately from other 'self-directed behaviour patterns'.) Second, it is a problem how one is to observe, if no mirror is present, animals engaging in self-directed behaviour of the sort described: how can one observe an animal grooming visually inaccessible parts of the body while watching its image in the mirror, picking bits of food from between its teeth while positioning itself before the mirror to see its teeth, and making faces while watching itself in the mirror, unless a mirror is present? The animals perform behaviour directed towards the mirror, behaviour that they do not direct towards other animals and that they do not perform in the same physical posture without the mirror. Furthermore, how control data could indicate that an animal enacting self-directed behaviour in front of the mirror is not using the mirror as a guide is unclear. If I groom a blemish 10 times on my face, then move my face in relation to a mirror to look at the blemish and groom it once, and then groom the blemish 10 times in the same way without a mirror, does that mean that I did not use the mirror as a guide for self-directed behaviour? What is important here is the animal's positioning of its body so as to use the mirror as a guide when performing self-directed behaviour, not the behaviour of the animal towards itself per se. Therefore, comparison of frequencies of 'behaviour patterns' with and without a mirror is confusing and inadequate (Parker et al. 1994, page 16) .
